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The article recently contributed to this journal by Juan José Ferrero-García concerning the 1902 International Convention for the Protection of Birds Useful to Agriculture 1 has helped to illuminate a rather dim and distant moment in conservation history insofar as it impacts specifically upon bird species by demonstrating how an early international agreement in that field 2 was effectively undermined by the emasculation of certain key substantive provisions during the course of the diplomatic negotiations that led to its ultimate adoption. It focuses in particular on certain changes that were made in the text ultimately agreed from an earlier draft that had emerged from a meeting of interested parties in 1895
3 . Yet it should not be supposed either that this process of dilution was in any respect unusual, or that without it the treaty in question would necessarily have secured major advances in the cause of avian conservation: indeed, the lessons of history point fairly clearly in the opposite direction. In order to substantiate the point, in may be helpful to provide a little information by way of context, particularly with regard to the nature and workings, and the historical development, of the international legal system generally.
The Development of the Modern International Legal System
Although there is ample scope for differences of opinion and perspective on the subject of the precise historical origins of that system, there is a relatively widespread consensus regarding the significance of the year 1648 to the process of its overall constitutional evolution. For it was then that the Treaty of Westphalia was concluded to bring an end to the Thirty Years War 4 , resulting in the sharp curtailment of the powers of the Holy Roman Empire and the emergence of the modern conception of nation states as discrete territorial units invested with sovereign authority in their own right 5 . The devolutionary spirit of the age left its inevitable mark on the emergent legal order, which was For an electronic source, in English, and indicating the changes made to the final version of the text from the interim 1895 draft, see the website of the American Society of International Law at http://eelink.net/~asilwildlife/ bird_1902.html. 3 An invaluable account of the drafting history and evolution of the text can be found in Herman (1907) , now also available electronically. The ASIL text referred to in the previous note is derived from this source. Official records of the deliberations leading to the conclusion of an international treaty (the so-called travaux pré-paratoires) are recognised as a legitimate (if not always especially helpful) aid to its interpretation: see on this point Article 32 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331 (which represents a codification of modern treaty law). In view of this, such records are nowadays quite often formally published, though not on any systematic basis. Herman's work is not quite of that character, but remains a valuable historical source, as it represents an account by an ornithological expert of the time, published by order of the Hungarian Minister of Agriculture.
characterised by a conspicuous lack of centralised machinery of a legislative, executive or judicial nature. Initially, therefore, the general principles of law, such as they were, which governed the relationships between the international polities of the period continued to be derived primarily from the writings of scholars, clerics and jurists of various nationalities and grounded largely in the supposed dictates of "right reason" and/or religious doctrine; as might be expected, they were fairly minimalist in aspiration and dedicated essentially to the maintenance of the most basic requirements for peaceful co-existence, as well as addressing certain of the consequences of conflict should it occur 6 . Obligations of a supplementary and more specialised character might be undertaken through the negotiation of formal agreements, or "treaties", between states, though these were generally concluded on a purely bilateral basis.
During the 18 th and more especially the 19 th Centuries, however, this phase of governance on the basis of so-called "natural law" progressively gave way to a more pragmatic, empirical and positivistic approach founded upon the conviction that international law was essentially the creation of sovereign states themselves, and was therefore to be determined from a scrutiny of their actual custom and practice 7 , as reflected in formal governmental pronouncements, diplomatic exchanges and approaches to the resolution of international disputes. Needless to say, such a revised conception of law did little to remove the controversies and uncertainties that existed regarding its precise scope and content 8 , and it became increasingly common for governments to seek to clarify and elaborate relevant principles through the formal codification and development of this practice-based customary law in written treaty form, to which all interested states might subscribe. Sometimes, such rules would be formulated as an adjunct to wider peace settlements 9 , but on other occasions they emerged independently, in circumstances where it had become apparent that the interests of good order could best be served by states seeking to negotiate cooperative arrangements that might forestall conflict or controversy in advance. A number of early examples concerned the great international 6 Important early contributors to the exposition of international law were the Spanish theologians Francisco Vitoria (1480 -1546 ) and Francisco Suárez (1548 -1617 , together with the Italian Alberico Gentili , who converted to Protestantism and took up a chair at Oxford University. Perhaps the most prominent pre-Westphalian figure, however, was the Dutch polymath Hugo de Groot (1583-1645), usually known as Grotius, who (though himself a devout Christian) adopted a more secular approach to international law, as reflected most notably in works on the law regulating war and peace and the law of the sea. Post-Westphalia, the "natural law" tradition was maintained by such authors as the German jurist Samuel von Pufendorf (1632-1694).
7 A pioneer of positivism was the English jurist and parliamentarian Richard Zouche (1590-1660), whose writings on international law largely eschewed theory and doctrine in favour of an exploration of practical examples of governmental conduct in international affairs. A similar approach was subsequently espoused by the Dutch lawyer Cornelius van Bynkershoek (1673 -1743 , sometimes regarded as the founder of the positivist school. Naturalism was never completely expunged from legal theory, however, and elements of it were combined with positivism by the Swiss lawyer/philosopher Emer de Vattel In his 1758 work Le Droit des Gens.
8 Plainly, such a system is scarcely viable at all in the absence of a systematic approach to the compilation of documentary materials providing formal evidence of state practice: the United States led the way in developing formal digests of its practice in international affairs and other governments have followed suit. 9 An important early example was the Declaration respecting Maritime Law, 115 CTS 1, which was signed at the Congress of Paris in 1856, following the Crimean War, and addressed certain aspects of maritime warfare.
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, which first forced states to confront the limitations of a strictly territorial approach to sovereignty in a world where certain natural features and resources had inevitably to be shared. Initially, rights of navigation formed the primary focus of attention but this came progressively to be extended to other issues as well 11 .
The 1902 Convention in Context
It was not, however, until the final quarter of the 19 th Century that such multilateral codification of the law began to become relatively commonplace and, unsurprisingly, environmental protection was scarcely at the forefront of states' attention during this period 12 . Consequently, when a congress of agriculturists and foresters convened in Vienna during 1868 first called for the establishment of international measures for the conservation of birds useful to agriculture, they were perhaps a little ahead of their time. It seems that the only early result was the commitment to that effect embodied in a Declaration of 1875 agreed by Italy with, and upon the initiative of, the Foreign Ministry of AustriaHungary 13 . Nevertheless, ancillary arrangements to the watercourse agreements referred to above gradually began to shade into the realm of environmental concern 14 , and disputes over the exploitation of marine resources were also beginning to be recognised as amenable to some form of international regulation 15 . In addition, the threatened devastation of the vineyards of Europe through the arrival from North America of the aphid-like insect Phylloxera vastatrix propelled the issue of plant protection from 12 Interestingly, the table of "major" environmental treaties and instruments in Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell (2009) has only one entry before 1940, and none from the 19 th Century. For the key concerns of the international community prior to 1900, at least as reflected in the treaty-making practice of the time, see Bowman and Harris (1984) , the entries to which are arranged chronologically. For discussion of the history and development of international environmental and conservation law, see, e.g., Sands and Peel (2012) , Chapter 2; , Chapter 1; Boardman (1981) . 13 For the text, see 4 IPE 1561. Ferrero-García (2013) notes its subsequent endorsement by France, Germany and Switzerland.
14 Regulations were adopted in 1868 concerning the transport of inflammable, corrosive and poisonous substances along the Rhine, 9 IPE 4689, and the following year with regard to fishing in the river, 9 IPE 4695; formal multilateral conventions on these questions were concluded in 1885 and 1900 respectively, as to which see 25 IPE 200, 214 . Fishing in the Danube was addressed in a convention of 1902, 190 CTS 344. 15 Concern regarding marine overfishing was reflected in the 1882 Treaty for the Regulation of the Police of the North Sea Fisheries, 160 CTS 219. The exploitation of fur seals in the northern hemisphere had also been the cause of friction, as reflected in the Bering Sea Fur Seals Arbitration of 1898 -a report of which can be found at 1 Moore's International Arbitrations 755-involving Great Britain (on behalf of Canada) and the US, following earlier attempts to achieve a modus vivendi by agreement, 8 IPE 3655. pests and diseases very squarely on to the international agenda 16 . Finally, the desire to protect African wildlife from rampant overexploitation resulted in what might be regarded as the first recognisable attempt at a general conservation treaty, the 1900 Convention for the Protection of Wild Animals, Birds and Fish in Africa
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, though even that, it must be acknowledged, was concluded by the colonial powers that then controlled that continent 18 , and had as its primary motivation the desire to secure an ongoing supply of targets for their game-hunters and trophy collectors 19 . Furthermore, while it may have stimulated certain developments at the national level, it never actually entered into force in a formal sense 20 . The conditions that trigger the coming into effect of a treaty are typically fixed in each individual instrument, and here they were unusually exacting 21 -it was necessary for ratifications to be deposited by all of the signatory governments 22 , and for a formal protocol then to be drawn up testifying to that fact, and signed by representatives of each, after which the treaty would enter into force a further month later. These 18 These were, specifically, France, the German Empire, Italy, Portugal, Spain and UK. The final signatory, to wit the "King-Sovereign of the Independent State of the Congo", was actually King Leopold II of Belgium, who had, with the initial acquiescence of other European powers, held that vast Central African territory under his personal control since 1885. Before long, however, increasing public outrage at the brutal treatment of the population compelled him to relinquish this authority, and it was formally annexed as a Belgian colony (i.e., Belgian Congo) in 1908. 19 For further discussion, see , Chapter 9, Part I; Boardman (1981) , Chapter 8. 20 Though practical effect was apparently given to its provisions in certain territories: see further, Orsinger (1971), 31-32, and 94 BFSP 715. 21 Nowadays, the relevant provision would normally require expressions of consent to be bound by a specified number of states, which would be determined by reference to the individual circumstances which affect the particular treaty in question. The 1971 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, 996 UNTS 245, and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, UN Doc A/CONF62/122; 21 ILM 1261, for example, both sought to attract universal participation, but while the threshold for entry into force of the former was set as low as seven acceptances (because it was judged desirable to bring it into force as soon as possible), the equivalent figure for the latter was 60 (because it was recognised that the comprehensive maritime regime it imposed would not really be viable at all in the absence of widespread support).
22 It is extremely important to understand that the term "signatory" must be used advisedly. Although it is perfectly possible in principle for a state to express its consent to be bound by a treaty by signature alone, this is relatively unusual in the case of complex, multilateral agreements. Signature may serve several purposes, the most important of which is merely to authenticate the text -i.e., to confirm that it indeed reflects what was actually agreed. Typically, the signatory states have not bound themselves to the treaty until a further formal act occurs-the deposit of an instrument of ratification. Apart from anything else, this delay enables the state in question to seek approval from its national legislature where necessary. The correct generic term for a state which has definitively expressed its consent to be bound by a treaty (by whatever means) is contracting state, and, once the treaty is actually in force for it, (contracting) party. See generally the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Articles 1-18.
conditions, it seems, were never fulfilled. Consequently, there was very little in the way of genuine, effective environmental regulation in operation on the international plane at the time when the 1902 Convention itself came to be concluded, rendering it a reasonably significant milestone in international affairs simply by virtue of its very existence.
The Key Determinants of Treaty Effectiveness
In addition to this historical background, it will also assist an understanding of this treaty's practical contribution to the cause of avian conservation to consider the regulatory context in which such arrangements must of necessity operate. In particular, it should be understood that the impact of any international treaty regime is likely to emerge as a function of three principal variables -namely, the range, rigour and appropriateness of its substantive provisions, the structure and effectiveness of the mechanisms incorporated for its practical implementation and the level of participation it is able to secure from the international community of states 23 . The first of these can clearly only be judged on an individual basis in the light of the specific aims and purview of the treaty in question, though a broader, more objective evaluation may be attempted by considering its overall consistency with the litany of general conservation principles that have been established in any given era in the course of the interactions that continuously occur between public opinion, scientific and technical discourse and the formal machinery of government. At the beginning of the 20 th Century, however, this process was scarcely under way at all.
Securing the effective implementation of treaty obligations in the environmental field has always proved a major challenge, especially since the policing function in international affairs is limited by the lack of centralised organs with executive authority: beyond the specific context of the use or threat of force, where the UN Security Council has since 1945 been accorded certain enforcement powers under the UN Charter 24 , such authority is virtually non-existent. While it might in theory be created for the purposes of any individual treaty regime 25 , for the most part such mechanisms are considered an unwelcome and unwarranted intrusion into national sovereignty. In the realm of conservation, it is far more likely that any implementation mechanisms that are so established will be designed to coax and cajole (rather than "command and control") delinquent states towards compliance, but even arrangements of this kind are very much a creation of the modern era.
A state aggrieved by the breach of an environmental obligation, whether derived from treaty or customary law, may conceivably seek to enforce it by the institution of international judicial or arbitral proceedings, but such action has never been undertaken lightly in view of the fact that it places ultimate decision-making power in the hands of a third party, and the strictures of respect for state sovereignty are again such that it will in any event require the consent of both states involved, whether expressed ad hoc or previously, in more abstract and generalised terms 26 . As a result, such claims have very seldom been initiated in the past 27 , and then primarily between states enjoying generally good relations who wish to defuse an isolated source of irritation or tension which exists between them. In very recent times, there have been signs of a change in these trends, and litigation may now be coming to be perceived more as a useful way of solving problems, than as an intrinsically unfriendly form of harassment
28 . Yet these developments were plainly beyond the contemplation of anyone at the turn of the 20 th Century, when the principal forums for dispute resolution on the basis of law had, indeed, yet to be created 29 . In consequence, the implementation of treaty obligations at the time the 1902 Convention was adopted was in practice largely a matter for the national authorities alone, to effectuate through whatever means they saw fit to employ. At the very least, it would have been considered to be implicit in the assumption of international legal commitments of any description that the parties involved must equip themselves at the national level with whatever legislative and/or administrative powers were necessary to enable them to carry out the commitments in question. Certainly, it has never been a valid legal defence to an allegation by another party of breach of treaty obligations that the state challenged lacks such power 30 . Yet in the realm of species conservation, there has traditionally been little incentive for such failures of compliance to be pursued at all, since -outside of the fisheries context, at least-the interests of other states have rarely been seen to be sufficiently strongly engaged by such subject-matter to warrant either the investment of effort or the risk of possible retaliation in the future. As a result, any state that opted to take a relaxed approach to the implementation of its treaty obligations (or even to ignore them altogether) is likely to have encountered little, if any, opposition or protest from other governments.
Underlying this unfortunate state of affairs is the last of the three determinants highlighted above, since it must always be borne in mind that a key practical implication of the notion of state sovereignty is that participation in treaty regimes is purely a matter of choice, and that no state may be compelled to become involved against its will 31 . Respect for individual sovereignty does not, of course, go so far as to preclude the possibility of an element of persuasion, or even political pressure, being brought to bear by other states in order to encourage one of their number to participate in an international treaty regime, but it will be relatively rare for the force of this to be so strong as to overwhelm the firm reluctance of any government to undertake the international legal commitments in question. There may always, of course, be requests or demands emerging from nongovernmental pressure groups and other domestic constituencies, as was the case with the 1902 Convention itself, but (as that same example also demonstrates) even where governments ultimately accede to such pressure, a considerable period of time may elapse before any tangible outcome is apparent.
As a result of these political realities, there is an inevitable element of tension between the three variables mentioned above: in particular, little useful purpose can be served by a treaty that seeks to impose onerous substantive commitments upon its parties and swingeing procedures to ensure compliance if the only result is that hardly any states consent to participate in the first place. A notable modern example is provided by the regional conservation convention adopted within the ASEAN organisation in 1985 32 , which looks impressively wide-ranging, wellinformed and shrewdly designed on paper but is still not in force nearly thirty years later, as it appears to have exceeded the bounds of the political will and commitment to conservation which is evident in the attitude of the states of the region 33 . This is always a risk where outside agencies have been heavily involved in the drafting of such instruments 34 . Perhaps for similar reasons, the latest version of the equivalent agreement for Africa has made depressingly slow progress towards the threshold set for entry into force 35 . Left entirely to their own devices, states are prone to allow their negotiations to drift towards the lowest common denominator of their enthusiasm for the project in hand, as the less committed participants seek constantly to water down the rigour of the text, bolstered 31 Natural concomitants of this principle in the modern law are the rules that treaties the conclusion of which has been procured by the threat or use of force in contravention of the UN Charter are null and void, and that expressions of consent to be bound by a treaty that have been procured by the coercion of its representatives are without legal effect: see Articles 51-52, 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 32 For the text, see (1985) 15 Environmental Policy & Law 64. 33 For further information on the ASEAN agreement, see , Chapter 12, Section 2. 34 In this particular case, IUCN was highly influential in the drafting process. 35 2003 (revised) African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, text available via www.au.int/en/treaties. For discussion, see , Chapter 9; Steiner (2004) . At the time of writing, it has attracted eleven of the fifteen acceptances required for entry into force.
by the knowledge that their ultimate ability to decline to participate altogether gives them every reason (at least as they tend to see it) to question or quibble over the detail of the substantive commitments they are being invited to accept. There have even been cases where states which have succeeded in extracting major concessions during the negotiation phase have ultimately declined to ratify the treaty even in its final, diluted form, leaving the actual parties with a weaker instrument than their collective commitment would have been prepared to support 36 . Such is the frustrating and haphazard nature of the treaty-drafting process! An additional dimension of sovereign power is manifest in the faculty of "denunciation" or withdrawal from treaties, which means that even states that have committed themselves to any particular regime will normally retain the option to terminate that commitment, upon the giving of appropriate notice, if the obligations assumed begin to appear unduly onerous or simply out of kilter with evolving policy priorities 37 . Although states have tended only rarely to avail themselves of this option in relation to treaties concerned specifically with species conservation, there have been some notable exceptions: in the case of the Whaling Convention of 1946 38 , for example, withdrawals (followed, on occasion, by later re-accession) have been a relatively frequent feature of business 39 . The sovereign authority of individual states may therefore undoubtedly serve as major impediment to progress where international conservation initiatives are concerned.
The Importance of Institutional Arrangements
Over the course of time, it has become apparent that the struggle to achieve a more effective reconciliation of the various factors that influence the effectiveness of treaties can be greatly advanced through the more widespread establishment of permanent institutional structures for the identification of collective goals, and the development of collaborative processes dedicated to their advancement. These institutions may need to be established, moreover, both within and beyond the purview of the individual treaty regimes themselves. The latter, more wideranging, form of institution will be required in order to collect, collate and disseminate the accumulating results of scientific research, and to establish a global agenda of conservation policy goals based upon it, while the former will be necessary to ensure that the individual treaty in question both fulfils its own aspirations as effectively as possible and operates consistently with this wider framework of understanding.
As regards institutions with the broader remit, significant progress has undoubtedly been achieved, but only slowly and laboriously. There has, of course, been a rather longer history of international collaboration between constituencies dedicated to the pursuit of other interests -trade and industrial concerns or scientific cooperation itself, for example-and, as the background to the adoption of the 1902 Convention itself demonstrates, these have occasionally and adventitiously been mobilised in the cause of species protection. Yet this will only be the case where such action chances to coincide with the primary objectives of such factions, who are unlikely to feel compunction in neglecting conservation aspirations for the most part, or even in vigorously opposing protective measures that they judge to put their own cherished interests at risk. A crucial challenge for conservationists has therefore been to establish a similar set of organs and systems that are dedicated specifically and exclusively to the protection of nature. Since governments themselves are in effective control of the international law-making process, and yet are unlikely to place this issue particularly high on their respective agendas, it will be essential to integrate the initiative, commitment and expertise of the non-governmental sector into this process. Substantive agendas would in the first instance sensibly focus upon the collection of statistical and other information regarding the current distribution, conservation status, ecological significance and behavioural characteristics of wildlife species, and the importance of ecosystem services, and then progress to the elaboration of substantive principles of conservation, and the means by which these might be translated into official policy and practice, as expressed through formally established normative regimes.
Needless to say, almost nothing of that kind was in place during the period when negotiations for the 1902 Convention were launched, though an important first step, albeit of limited substantive scope, did occur in that very year with the establishment of the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) 40 . Its objective was to increase scientific knowledge of the marine environment and its living resources, and it came to play a major role in laying the foundations for the new science of fishery assessment and management. It was not until a few years later, however, that the first significant steps were taken on a broader front, in the form of an attempt to create a general Consultative Commission for the International Protection of Nature. This was actually agreed in principle by a consortium of states in 1913 41 , following an initiative at the Eighth International Congress of Zoology prompted by the Swiss conservationist Paul Sarasin 42 , but the outbreak of war in Europe unfortunately halted the process in its tracks.
Nevertheless, a degree of momentum was undeniably building up in non-governmental circles regarding the enhancement of transnational cooperation for conservation, and this came to be reflected in certain key developments that occurred during the inter-war years. The first of these entailed the creation in 1922 -at a meeting held, oddly enough, at the private home of the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Robert Horne 41 For the agreement itself, which took the form of a conference resolution endorsed by 14 European powers, the US and Argentina, see 219 CTS 32. 42 For discussion, see Boardman (1981), pp.26-30. 43 It is interesting to note that an eponymous group of companies founded by Robert Horne in 1925, after he left ministerial office, became a major supplier of paper, board and plastics and in recent times has been engaged to supply (recycled) paper to the UK's Royal Society for the Protection of Birds for use in their promotional materials. A current namesake is a wildlife photographer, a sample of whose excellent pictures of birds and other wildlife can be seen at www.flickr.com/photos/robert_horne/. organisation was designed to co-ordinate the activities of national NGOs concerned with avian conservation, not only within Europe but across the Atlantic as well. Indeed its first president was T. Gilbert Pearson, the noted American ornithologist and a key figure in the elaboration of protective legislation in the US, not to mention the bilateral treaty on migratory birds which had been concluded with Canada in 1916 44 . ICBP, which has rebranded itself in the modern era as BirdLife International, emerged early on as one of the key players in international avian conservation, providing the impetus, initiative, funding and expertise for many of the important developments in that field that have been achieved on the inter-governmental plane. On the broader conservation front, the American Committee for International Wildlife Protection was established in 1930 as an umbrella group for national conservation organisations in the western hemisphere, while in Europe the distinguished Dutch conservationist Pieter van Tienhoven spearheaded a movement that led to the creation in 1934 of the International Office for the Protection of Nature (IOPN), an organisation that was eventually to be transformed into IUCN, the World Conservation Union 45 . IUCN has occupied a central place in the development of conservation theory, policy and practice during the modern era, supported from the early 1960s by its sister organisation, the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF).
The half-century from World War I to the mid-1960s was duly characterised by what might be regarded for present purposes as a "second wave" of conservation treaties, a good many of which were concerned specifically with fisheries of one sort or other 46 , though there were also a number that were of rather greater significance for present purposes in terms of the biological taxa covered. A revised version of the 1900 African treaty was agreed between the colonial powers in 1933 47 , and placed a particularly heavy emphasis upon the creation of national parks and nature reserves. A special licensing system, designed to go beyond the controls imposed by ordinary game licences, was to be introduced for the protection of certain species listed in the annex, Class A of which embraced species whose protection was considered "of special urgency and importance", and which therefore might not be hunted, killed or captured other than for important scientific or essential administrative reasons 48 . 46 For description and analysis of the treaties in question, see Koers (1973) . 47 172 LNTS 241; 137 BFSP 241; 4 IPE 1693. This one did enter into force, on 14 January 1936. 48 The only avian species included in Class A were the whale-headed stork or shoe-bill Balaeniceps rex, the baldheaded ibis Comatibis eremitica, now Geronticus eremita, and the white-breasted Guinea fowl Agelastes meleagrides. A handful of others, mainly storks, egrets and herons, but also two hornbills, the ostrich and the secretary bird, were included in Class B, and could accordingly only be hunted by the holders of special licences, though without the strict substantive restrictions applicable to Class A. 49 The Pan-American Union, which emerged from late-19 th Century attempts to promote social, political and commercial co-operation between Latin-American states and the US, was the world's first pan-continental consultative organisation, and has a long and prolific history of treaty-making amongst its members. Since 1948 it has been known as the Organisation of American States. which, apart from its recognition of a variety of types of protected area 50 , introduced the novel idea that an individual species might be declared a national "nature monument" 51 . It also made explicit provision for the conservation of migratory birds 52 , a topic which had also been addressed by the US in a second bilateral treaty, this time with its southern neighbour Mexico, just a few years earlier 53 . Finally, a replacement for the 1902 Convention itself was agreed between certain European governments in 1950, in which not only did the notion of noxious species disappear, but the sectoral orientation towards agricultural interests was also eliminated 54 . It is unnecessary for present purposes to address these agreements in detail, other than to highlight one specific aspect -namely, the role of institutional arrangements that, in contrast to those discussed above that span the entire field of conservation endeavours, are created within and function exclusively for the purposes of individual treaty regimes. Typically, these take the form of periodic meetings or conferences of the contracting parties, often referred to as MoPs or CoPs respectively. Provision for the creation of such organs has emerged as a critical feature for addressing and defusing the tension referred to above amongst the various factors that impact upon their overall effectiveness 55 . For, once there is a permanent forum dedicated exclusively to the advancement of the objectives of a particular treaty, in which all parties concerned can meet regularly to reflect on progress (or the lack of it), a new world of possibility is effectively opened. Parties can be requested to report on their progress towards implementation, and to highlight any difficulties or impediments they have experienced in their attempts to do so. Treaty provisions that have proved problematic can be clarified or subtly reinterpreted -and even, in the last resort, formally amended-wherever necessary. Joint programmes, projects and policies can be agreed and put into effect, and additional, intensified commitments presented for adoption if the parties are willing to accept them. A supporting bureaucracy can be established to assist in these and other endeavours. The enthusiasm, initiative, resources and expertise of the non-governmental sector can be integrated into the process as appropriate. States that were originally unwilling to subscribe to the treaty in question may be invited to attend as observers, and perhaps to participate in certain projects; ultimately, they may even be drawn into full-blown participation. Although some of these advances could in theory be achieved even without the establishment of formal institutional arrangements, the key point is that where such arrangements have actually been adopted progress tends to follow as a matter of course.
Thus, whereas during the earlier period of multilateral treaty-making, the conclusion of an agreement might be seen essentially as an event -a normative snapshot in time, if you will, after which the negotiating states simply went their separate ways and pursued the question of implementation on a purely individual basis-the realisation gradually dawned that this was unlikely to prove a viable method of fulfilling conservation (or, indeed, any other) aspirations. The great virtue of establishing permanent institutional arrangements as an intrinsic feature of the regime in question is that the treaty becomes less of a mere event and more of an organic process, a moving picture that enables a much more dynamic and effective narrative of implementation to emerge and be sustained over time, and on a collective basis.
Given the abiding preoccupation of national governments with development aspirations, it will doubtless come as no surprise that the area of conservation concern where this idea first caught on was the fisheries sector 56 , the economic significance of which has for many governments always been such as to justify a major investment of time, money and effort into the defence of long term exploitation interests. A major breakthrough occurred in 1923, with the adoption by the US and Canada of the bilateral Convention for the Preservation of the Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean 57 , commonly recognised as "the first treaty to be concluded anywhere for the conservation of a depleted deep-sea fishery" 58 . In particular, it established a mandatory close season from mid-November to mid-February for the fishery in question, but with the possibility of ad hoc modification of this restriction by the parties themselves upon the recommendation of a newly-created standing Commission comprising two representatives of each.
The salaries and expenses of their respective appointees were to be paid by each party, and any expenses incurred by the Commission as such were to be shared 59 . Since there was no similar body with which it might be confused, it was known simply as the International Fisheries Commission; it was further charged with the task of investigating the life-cycle of the species in question and reporting back to the parties with recommendations regarding any additional measures that might be needed for its conservation. This regime is still effectively in operation today, though, in order to distinguish it from its many contemporary counterparts for other fisheries, the organisation established is now known as the International Pacific Halibut Commission 60 . It has enjoyed significant success, and the fishery is said to be in a healthy state. It would, of course, be fanciful to suggest that this success has been replicated across the entire field of regional fisheries management organisations, but the experience at least demonstrates the potential utility of permanent institutions in the conservation field, provided the underlying commitment is genuine and the political realities are such that the zeal for overexploitation is realistically susceptible to containment.
The extension of such arrangements to other areas of conservation endeavour has, however, always been more problematic, since political perceptions of the economic significance of such activities have been very different. Nevertheless, the first tentative steps in the direction of recognising the necessity for the establishment of institutional arrangements in treaty regimes were also taken during this period. In particular, the 1933 African Convention provided in an accompanying protocol that "periodic international Conferences shall be held at appropriate intervals" in order to facilitate cooperation for the conservation of the region's fauna and flora, and to monitor the working of the Convention and consider any improvements that might be required 61 . The first such meeting was explicitly scheduled to occur within four years 62 , and actually took place, almost in accordance with this timetable, in 1938 63 . Thereafter, however, events conspired to bring this process to a premature end. The outbreak of World War II caused the first hiatus and, in the difficult period of austerity and reconstruction that followed, the UK, as depositary for the treaty, was unwilling to convene a further meeting. In any event, the very idea of a conservation treaty for Africa that was concluded at the behest of European powers began to look increasingly incongruous in the era of decolonisation ushered in by the UN Charter 64 . By 1963, a sufficient number of African states had achieved their independence to enable the creation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 65 , and although a notable early achievement of the organisation was the conclusion of a nature conservation treaty amongst its members 66 , the impetus behind automatic, ongoing institutional support could not be sustained in that context. The new treaty provided only for the possibility of follow-up meetings being convened at the request of three contracting states and with the approval of two-thirds of the proposed participants 67 , and none was ever held. In the meantime, however, the 1971 Ramsar Convention on Wetlands 68 had become the first post-war multilateral convention in the wildlife field to make provision (admittedly, on a rather tentative basis initially) for regular meetings of its parties to review implementation 69 , and Africa (London, 1938) , cited in Boardman (1981), at 146, and van Heijnsbergen (1997) No.31 (1956) , Cmd 9834, with its own Commission based in London, but this was scarcely a viable long-term arrangement. Before long, the organisation was transferred to Lagos, Nigeria, and later Yaoundé, Cameroon, and absorbed into the structure of the OAU (as to which, see the text immediately following): see generally Ebbels (2003), 257-258. 65 For the Charter of the OAU (which has now transformed itself into the African Union), see 479 UNTS 39. 66 1968 Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, 1001 UNTS 3. For brief discussion, see , Chapter 9, and, for a more extended analysis, Lyster (1985) , Chapter 7. 67 Article XXIV. Note that under the 2003 revision (which is not yet in force), the parties will meet regularly, on a two-yearly cycle.
68 See note 21 above. 69 Article 6, which was amended in 1987 to tighten the arrangements in question. such arrangements very rapidly became the norm 70 . The modern era, or "third wave", of conservation treaty regimes had effectively begun. Yet little or none of this is likely to have impinged upon the imagination -let alone have been within the active contemplation-of those engaged in the drafting of treaties back at the turn of the 20 th century.
Evaluating the 1902 Convention
In the light of the considerations highlighted above as bearing upon the effectiveness of treaty regimes, it becomes possible to offer an overall evaluation of the 1902 Convention itself. One point that can be disposed of reasonably rapidly concerns the third key determinant of effectiveness highlighted above, namely the level of participation by states. Given the time of its adoption, and the fact that it was essentially a European initiative, the Convention can be judged moderately successful on that score, and the roll-call of negotiating states that opted to ratify 71 -namely, Austria-Hungary 72 , Belgium, France, Germany, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland-was later to be augmented by the Netherlands and Poland, who acceded in 1917 and 1932 respectively, and Czechoslovakia, which appears to have become a party by succession 73 . This was actually more impressive than the level of support achieved by the treaty designed to replace it in 1950 74 . Nevertheless, this record was still far from perfect: it is not clear that Greece ever followed up its signature with ratification 75 and, as Ferrero-García himself notes, Italy, Netherlands, Russia and the UK declined to engage with the negotiations altogether 76 . Plainly, the participation of these states would have expanded the geographical 71 Definitive information on the status of multilateral conventions can only be obtained from the depositary of the treaty in question, in this case the government of France. Details may be found online in the Base des Traités et Accords de la France, viewable via http://basedoc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/Traites/Accords_Traites.php, though a degree of uncertainty exists in relation to this particular treaty, the entry for which does not tally in all respects with information provided to the University of Nottingham Treaty Centre by the French Ministère des Affaires Etrangères during the preparation of supplements to Bowman and Harris (1984) . The online entry appears to reflect the original twelve signatories (though with Austria and Hungary now listed separately, to make a total of thirteen) rather than the eventual parties. For the crucial significance of this distinction, see note 22 above, and for the specific discrepancies, see the notes following. 72 Following the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918, Austria and Hungary were regarded as having automatically become separate parties in their own right, through the process of succession. On the complex issue of succession to treaty relations generally (which may arise whenever there is a break in the continuity of international personality, through an amalgamation or dissolution of states) see Aust (2007) , Chapter 21. 73 The information referred to in note 71 confirms the participation of Netherlands and Poland and further suggests that, following its independence, Czechoslovakia (the territory of which had also fallen within the Empire) also regarded itself as having succeeded to this particular treaty. 74 As to which, see note 54 above. The parties to the later instrument were only ten in number: viz., Belgium, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and Yugoslavia. 75 Greece does not feature in the list of parties included in the information referred to in note 71 above. 76 Though some years later the Dutch government evidently changed its mind and opted to become a party after all. coverage, and hence the potential impact, of the Convention to a very significant degree. On the other hand, it would be mistaken to draw any exact equation between treaty participation and general conservation commitment, since certain non-party states in fact maintained relatively rigorous legislation for avian conservation during this period, while some of those that were parties failed almost entirely to translate their treaty commitments into meaningful action at the national level 77 . With regard to the substantive commitments contained in the Convention, certain key deficiencies of the text finally agreed, and the circumstances in which they came to be present, have already been ably highlighted by Ferrero-García himself. These were (i) the classification, largely as the result of the agricultural interests which had prompted the treaty's adoption in the first place, of certain species (including many birds of prey) as harmful ("nuisibles"), and on that account excluded from protection entirely 78 , and (ii) the restriction during the negotiating process of the taxonomic scope of Article 5, which forbade the killing of birds during the breeding season, with the result that it ultimately extended only to species specified in Schedule I, rather than to birds generally 79 . Yet this did not by any means exhaust the limitations of the Convention, which also included a number of exceptions or "escape clauses" that further severely curtailed its protective potential. The incorporation of such provisions in a conservation treaty is, of course, by no means unusual in itself: indeed, it would be rare to encounter an instrument of this kind that omitted any such provision, since even from a purely conservationist perspective it might very well not be realistic, or even desirable, to establish a regime of absolute, unqualified wildlife protection 80 . Some exceptions, indeed, such as that in the 1902 Convention in accordance with which the taking of individual birds "for scientific purposes or to encourage the propagation of birds" might be authorised in specific cases 81 , may actually be designed to benefit conservation. The threat posed by such provisions therefore depends very much on the precise nature and extent of the exception in question, and the possibilities for abuse of the leeway it allows.
Ardeola 61(1), , 171-196 1902 77 See on this point Bowman, Davies and Redgwell (2010), 201; Ferrero-García (2013) .
78 See Article 9, and for the species so classified, Schedule II. Ferrero-García is, however, doubtless correct to point out that this was largely in keeping with the general cultural attitudes of the time: it was certainly a prominent feature of the 1900 African convention referred to above, which also made it quite explicit through Article II(13) that animals such as lions, leopards, hyenas, wild dogs, birds of prey, crocodiles, poisonous snakes and pythons were also not only to be denied protection but positively targeted for persecution. 79 In the draft tabled for discussion in 1895, the only principal categories to be denied this protection (along with species deemed harmful) were poultry and game birds: Article 8. Under the revised version, by contrast, this denial would extend by default to any species not expressly listed; Ferrero-García himself identifies various taxa that came to forfeit protection as a direct result of this change, including sparrows, buntings * , larks, shrikes and orioles. ( * Note that, although in the ASIL English translation of the treaty derived from Herman, note 3 above, "bunting" is presented as the equivalent of "venturon" in Schedule I of the original, authentic French text, it seems clear from the context, including the accompanying Latin descriptors, Citrinella et Serinus, that the species referred to here as protected were actually the citril finch Serinus citrinella and the serin S. serinus, from the family Fringillidae).
In this particular case, the (arguably automatic) exclusion from protection of the species designated as harmful to agriculture 82 , albeit understandable in the light of the treaty's origins, was certainly extremely unfortunate in terms of the species thereby rendered free for eradication, which included not only numerous birds of prey 83 , but also the raven Corvus corax, bittern Botaurus stellaris, night heron Nycticorax nycticorax and purple heron Ardea purpurea 84 , as well as pelicans, cormorants, smews and divers generically 85 . Many of these have clearly suffered mightily from such persecution and are today accorded the highest form of protection 86 . Some of them, it might be noted, may not actually seem particularly threatening to farmers at all 87 , but it should not be overlooked that Article 9 also permitted the destruction of birds that were harmful to sport shooting and fishing (though there was clearly some confusion throughout the process as to whether Schedule II as such was designed to embrace this type of outlaw species as well or only those that were harmful to agriculture specifically) 88 . It is also noteworthy that, in addition to this provision for what were perceived as inherently noxious species, parties were also permitted to grant "exceptional, temporary licences" to the owners or cultivators of vineyards, orchards, gardens, woodlands or cornfields to shoot birds (presumably of any species whatsoever) that were actively causing damage to those areas 89 . Beyond that, the Convention also allowed for further exceptions, several of which represented later additions to the original 1895 82 Although the opening phrase of Article 9 appears to grant a mere permission to exclude harmful species from protection, its final clause provides, in the case of birds harmful to agriculture specifically, that while states were free to draw up their own lists of such species, in default of their doing so the list in Schedule II "shall be enforced", suggesting an obligation (albeit of a conditional kind).
draft. These clauses varied significantly in terms not only of the scope that they offered for abuse, but also of their potential to undermine the cause of conservation even if applied exactly as envisaged by the drafters. With regard to hunting, for example, the dispensation granted in respect of the Northern provinces of Sweden from enforcement of the requirement that game birds outside designated reserves might be taken only with firearms and during permitted periods of the year might seem like a narrow and understandable concession to practicality, given the remoteness of these regions and their "absolutely peculiar climatic conditions" 90 , whereas the reduction from a legal commitment to the status of a mere exhortation that commerce in illegally taken game birds be prohibited 91 , was clearly much more wide-ranging and potentially deleterious in its effects. The permission extended to "the countries of Northern Europe" to modify the close season established by Article 5 for the taking of Schedule I birds 92 might prove more or less damaging depending on the nature of the adjustment and the considerations by which it had been motivated, while the added clause which permitted the exclusion of gull and lapwing eggs from the general prohibition on egg collection was at least limited in taxonomic scope 93 . Although it might readily be judged acceptable that the owner of a house or building be permitted to destroy nests constructed inside it, it was perhaps a little less clear that the same freedom should have been granted unconditionally regarding those built on the outside, or within courtyards 94 . Most troublingly of all, perhaps, the exception established by Article 4, which allowed the parties to defer or dilute the ban imposed by Article 3 on the use of indiscriminate methods of capture wherever they felt themselves to be "not in a position to enforce" it, subject only to a commitment to introduce protective measures "gradatim" 95 , plainly carried considerable subversive potential, and arguably had the effect of negating altogether the legal quality of one of the most important commitments that the Convention sought to establish 96 . One potential counterweight to the abuse of such exceptions can be found in the institution within treaty regimes of procedures entailing accountability, whereby any party which opts to avail itself of the reserved powers in question might be called upon to justify, or at least to notify other parties of, any action taken in that regard. Yet this, of course, requires both a forum and a suitable occasion at which such explanations might be delivered, and neither was envisaged or provided under the terms of the 1902 Con-vention. As a result, parties were in practice left with very considerable discretion as to whether they complied with their obligations or not. It has been noted that French ornithologists duly acknowledged at an international conference in 1932 that the effect of these various loopholes in the protective regime established by the Convention had been to render it virtually a dead letter in their country 97 . This mention of accountability, and to the possibility of a forum at which it might be put into practice, leads directly to the remaining key determinant of treaty effectiveness identified above, namely the provision of mechanisms for ensuring the due implementation of the commitments they contain. Once again, it should come as no surprise that the 1902 Convention contained no provision for such follow-up procedures to occur automatically, since in that respect it was very much a creature of its time. Indeed, against the historical background highlighted above, the more relaxed provision in Article 12 that the parties might convene a further conference should they judge it expedient to do so in the light of any issues that had surfaced regarding implementation of the treaty actually appears quite commendable and forward-looking for its time. Nonetheless, no such meeting was actually to occur before the outbreak of war plunged Europe into deep and debilitating turmoil for several years.
Despite this lack of activity at the diplomatic level, the question of avian conservation, and the role of the treaty arrangements in that regard, naturally remained squarely on the agenda of ICBP, and pressure from that quarter for the creation of a revised regime led to the adoption in 1950 of a new International Convention for the Protection of Birds 98 , which was designed explicitly to supersede the 1902 Convention in legal terms 99 . Yet it might be noted that, although this post-war instrument undoubtedly represented a significant advance over its predecessor in terms of the substantive commitments it contained, it too suffered from the omission to make any provision for institutional monitoring and support, and on that account largely failed to impact dramatically on the cause of avian conservation. Indeed, a review conducted for the purposes of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit declared it to be effectively "moribund" 100 , notwithstanding the fact that it is still technically in force for the parties concerned.
This absence of institutional support clearly begs the question of exactly what means, if any, were available to ensure that the obligations contained in the 1902 Convention (or, indeed, in its 1950 replacement) were actually carried out in practice. As the remarks made above regarding the treaty's failure to make a significant impact tend to demonstrate, these were in fact remarkably few. As noted above, it would normally be considered implicit in the adoption of international legal commitments that the state in question would equip itself with whatever powers were need to enable it to fulfil those obligations at the national level. In this particular case, no reliance on implication was required, since the duty of each party to introduce appropriate legislation was spelled out explicitly in both Articles 1 and 10, and the parties even undertook to notify each other of the measures adopted via the depositary government, France 101 . In theory, those measures would then be applied and enforced in such a way as to ensure the treaty's implementation, and in the ordinary way, this obligation of each state to bring about this situation would become legally effective from the moment of its entry into force. In this case, however, the temporal incidence of the relevant duties was expressed in decidedly delphic fashion.
The ostensibly unconditional protection from killing required by Article 1 for Schedule I birds, for example, seemed to have no fixed point of commencement, for it was provided that the obligations established by the other articles were intended to apply "until such time as this result shall be completely realised"
102
. Furthermore, the precise nature of this interim commitment was only "to take, or to propose to their Parliaments to take" all the measures necessary to implement those other obligations 103 . Presumably, therefore, a government whose proposal to that effect was rejected by its own legislature could not be said to have defaulted on its treaty commitments. In addition, the apparently open-ended discretion allowed to states to defer full enforcement of the ban on indiscriminate methods of capture has already been noted, while the ancillary prohibition imposed by Article 5 on import, transportation and delivery of Schedule I birds during the close season was only required as far as the parties respective laws permitted. These commitments are therefore so relaxed as to cast doubt upon whether they amount to genuine legal duties at all, and in the absence of any institutional mechanism for supervising and encouraging their progressive effectuation it can scarcely constitute a surprise that they should have drifted from the parties' active consciousness entirely in relatively short order.
At the same time, this very vagueness also helped to undermine what was probably the only other potential mechanism for compelling states to bring their domestic arrangements into line with the aspirations of the 1902 Convention, namely the instigation of litigation in the national courts. This possibility, it must be noted, depends entirely upon the particular constitutional position in each country regarding the relationship between treaties to which it is party and the national legal order 104 . In the UK and most other common law jurisdictions, treaties to which the country in question is party are regarded purely as the product of executive action on the international plane, and have no direct effect upon the national legal order until transformed into domestic law by legislation 105 . In the US and many other countries (including a number in Europe), by contrast, treaties may potentially qualify to be regarded as part of national law in their own right 106 , which raises the possibility of their being enforced through the national courts by persons or bodies with appropriate legal was launched in Belgium in 1964 by the administrator of that country's nature reserves, who argued that, in allowing the shooting of certain birds throughout March, the national hunting regulations were incompatible with the obligations imposed by Article 2 of the Convention 115 . Unfortunately, the Belgian Conseil d'Etat held that the treaty provision invoked could not be regarded as self-executing, and therefore could not be relied upon to annul or override acts or regulations of the Belgian legislature. The combination of these fundamental deficiencies in the area of implementation renders it unsurprising that the Convention should have appeared moribund by the time of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit.
Final Reflections
When judged in the light of the criteria referred to above, neither the 1902 Convention nor its 1950 successor can be judged to have made a particularly noteworthy practical contribution to the cause of avian conservation. While the latter undoubtedly represented a substantial advance over the former in terms of the substantive obligations it imposed, it was rather less successful in attracting states to participate. Both Conventions, moreover, lacked the institutional mechanisms likely to be needed for the effective implementation of the obligations they respectively imposed. These various deficiencies were, however, largely the result of the relatively underdeveloped levels of knowledge and understanding that prevailed at the time of their adoption, whether in relation to the science of conservation itself or to the functional imperatives of the treaty-making process. It is fortunate that, while still technically in force for various states, they have for all practical purposes been superseded by a network of more modern arrangements 116 , amongst which the Ramsar Wetlands Convention 117 , the 1973 CITES treaty which regulates the international trade in wildlife 118 , and above all the 1979 Bonn Migratory Species Convention 119 , and its many "daughter" agreements 120 are arguably the most significant for bird conservation at the global level. Within Europe itself, the 1979 Bern nature conservation convention is unquestionably vibrant 121 , and eminently fit to be regarded as a model for other regions, while the existence of European Union law adds a whole new dimension to the efficacy of transnational conservation law 122 . Yet every successful model requires its prototypes, and without the precedents set by pioneering endeavours such as the 1902 Convention, it is most unlikely that these more illustrious modern counterparts would be in place today.
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